ITEM 1: The Balkan's image problem in the European Union

Background note
Gerald Knaus is the President of ESI and one of the two founding analysts. He spends much of his time across South Eastern Europe, where he coordinates field research, and drafts ESI papers and publications which are being presented to the international community, and to EU leaders in particular. He is often invited to brief policy makers and to speak publicly on South Eastern European politics and economics. That's what he did recently at a hearing in the European Parliament about South East Europe, in March 2003, where he was interviewed.

SHOTLIST ITEM 1
00:02:51
Cutaways
Brussels, Aerial view Atomium with European flag, Grand Place, European institutions (Commission, Council, European parliament)
03.53
Cutaways
Brussels, European Parliament, hearing on South East Europe 19.03.2004
Atmosphere and participants
04.28
Gerald Knaus speaks at the hearing
05.26
Nick Whyte in the audience

Suggested commentary: in EU circles in Brussels, lobby groups like ESI and ICG have some influence in shaping EU policies. EU Politicians listen to experts before drafting their policy papers. In March 2003, a hearing on South East Europe was organized in the European Parliament, where Members of all EU institutions dealing with the Balkans were present to listen to the recommendations made by key experts on the future policy the EU should adopt towards the Balkans. Among them were Gerald Knaus (ESI) and Nick Whyte ICG).

00:05.30
Interview Gerald Knaus

On the wrong perception of the Balkans by the European public, and on the need to use instruments of EU accession

If you look at South-East Europe today, form here, from Brussels you sometimes get the feeling that the problem of South-Eastern Europe is purely corruption and organized crime and we've always argued that this is the wrong way to look at it. If you compare crime rates in western Balkan states, even in post-war states like Bosnia they are not significantly higher than in other countries that are now joining Europe. Even organized crime, is, really if you brake it down into specific problems, you have specific problems in Serbia, specific problems of smuggling, specific problems of trafficking of human beings but they are not what marks the region as different from the rest of Europe. What marks the region as different is that there are development problems as a result of its economic history as a result of the lost decade of the 1990s are very severe, so what we are arguing is that European assistance instead of sending just more police and more military and more customs officials and more prosecutors to the region should develop the tools that it has developed to support industrial conversion or rural underdevelopment or infrastructure and especially human capital to support the retraining that has served Ireland so well to catch up in the last 20 years but these are the instruments one needs for the western Balkans and the European Union especially has these instruments.

I mean this is what Europe is all about: remove trade barriers through the discipline of the free market, move towards monetary union or macroeconomic stability through the discipline of fiscal policy, don't spend more than you have, at the same time regional policy is to support the regions that by themselves will not catch up to catch up and this is really why we think that Thessaloniki should be the summit of European cohesion cause cohesion is the European idea that even those regions that risk falling behind should be helped to catch up and extends to all of Europe at the moment except the western Balkans and hopefully after Thessaloniki this promise of cohesion will extend also to the western Balkans.

00.07.30
Stockshots
Ireland EU structural funds

(to illustrate G. Knaus explanation on the need for cohesion policy in the Balkans)

Ireland: various illustration shots of EU structural (or cohesion) funds in Ireland, which played a key role in the economic development of Ireland when the country became a member of the EU.
It is this kind of funding which Gerald Knaus proposes the EU to use in the Balkans.

00:08.45
Interview Gerald Knaus

On the need for the Balkans to become more pro-active towards the EU

Well I think what is very, very important is that you realize that this is a debate inside Europe that can be shaped that influences. I think that it is very important that the countries of the region re-recognize that they have to shape the European debate on their future. Until now I think a lot of the political leaders in the region have been thinking that somehow they just have to wait and that the European Union is going to take the decisions regardless. Your government I think, Croatia in particular have shown recently what effect can be of being corrective. I think your application has been very well received in Brussels even though there has been a lot of scepticism before. Now, I think, pro-activity is a very important thing. The second thing I think is very important is to combat the image that this region is hopelessly divided, particularly it's European future. I think it is very effective if as we've just seen with Skopje, Macedonian president, the Croatian government, the representatives of Serbia and Montenegro jointly present the case and I think this is very important because it sends the signal that the region is changing the region is serious about wanting to move closer to Europe so joint lobbying, joint presentations at the levels of embassies, at the levels of the Ministers might be a good way and not only targeted at the European institutions. I think that it is quite important to make the case to the European public that remembers images of the war and has the image of the region that is, frankly, not very good and not always just, not always justified to target the European public, to invite the journalists, to show, for example that in the wake of the death of Djindjic there is actually across the region a feeling of solidarity and there is also across the region determination not to sit back but to do something about organised crime. That's the third point: to bring out the positive stories, stories about corruption and organised crime sell well. They are also very easy to sell politically, I mean everybody in the region I know accuses everybody else of being corrupt, it's a good political tool but it harms the region as a whole to use it in an indiscriminate way, so, bringing out the positive stories, bringing out the story that in Bosnia today that lots of people have returned and that there is very little inter-ethnic violence, ordinary people don't attack each other. Bringing out the sense of common interests, the increasing contacts I think is very important, so lobby, present your case, make the arguments, argue that you are in favour of more discipline when you receive assistance, tougher conditions are similar to those that are given to Poland or Southern Italy when he is given assistance but also fight the image of the Balkans, an image of passivity and organised crime and backwardness and just little countries fighting each other, this is not the reality. But you need to do more to bring that message to the European public.

00:11.30

ITEM 2:Interview Nick Whyte, International Crisis Group The EU and the Balkans, issues at stake in the run-up to the Thessaloniki Summi

Background note
The International Crisis Group (ICG) is one of the leading "think tanks" or lobby groups in Brussels, trying to influence EU decision-making. ICG is very active in making recommendations to EU politicians on South Eastern Europe. Nick Whyte is one of the key Balkans analysts at the ICG.

00:11:35
Cutaways International Crisis Group
Images of Brussels, Avenue Louise, where the ICG offices are situated. Shots of the building, plaque. Office atmosphere, Nick Whyte walking in the corridor, talking to his assistant, talking to his colleagues, in his office.

00.13.28
Interview Nick Whyte

On issues at stake ahead of the Thessaloniki Summit

The bigger question here is the possibility of upgrading the stabilisation and the association process into something that is more vigorous, into something that has got more content into something that looks much more like the EU accession process which is now coming to a conclusion for the candidate and accession countries, and there, there is a reluctance from certainly some of the larger member states to take any new policy initiatives and that reluctance is largely shared by the European Commission. It's not universal, however. It is clear to me that the Greek presidency of the European Union does want to have it more vigoury inside the EU, they want to move more closely towards integration and stabilisation I think as well as rather than instead of. That's also true of I think of the British government and I think of some of the more smaller member states but I detect a reluctance in France and Germany to go back to the drawing board, I detect that the French feel pleased with teh Zagreb summit form the year 2000, the Germans happy with the Stability Pact from 1999 and they are not really willing to admit that more could be done on top of those policies. The debate will continue over the next two months and presumably something new will come out of the Thessalonikki Summit. Weather it is sufficient, of course, we will have to wait and see.

00:14:53
It is clear that there is a political consensus for giving more money to the Balkans and that's my, that's my impression purely from my informal conversations with the people around the institutions. Enlargement has happened much sooner than people have expected, that means there is a certain amount of extra money. Whether it will go into structural funds or whether it will go into some other means that is not at all clear. That I think is the part of the discussions going on up to the Thessalonikki Summit. Whether Thessalonikki Summit will be a real new era or not basically depends on how well the Greeks and others argue their case in front of the Commission and the more reluctant member states in the next few months. I think there is a good chance, I think there is a real sense from EU actors that it's important to show that EU can actually be active and vigorous somewhere to do something to overcome the trauma over divisions over Iraq and to do something to overcome the perception of impotence over the Israel-Palestine issue where the EU does have a united view but can do nothing to implement it because of the Americans. So I think there is actually quite a good chance as long as it will produce something rather interesting rather than just another boring EU summit declaration.

00:16:10
On the EU and Serbia and Montenegro

Well, my view is not always a popular one but I actually think it is still important to maintain the conditionality that was already in place I think it is very important that we continue to insist on the compliance with the war crimes tribunal, it is important that we insist on democratic control of the military and it's very interesting that the government in Belgrade has been moving on precisely these issues in the last few weeks, ahm, precisely because they realize that failure to address these issues in a way actually lead to the assassination of Djindjic. That's what I think the EU should do. I think it also needs to be acknowledged that Serbia has made big strides in stamping out power of organised crime and of irregular military formations inside Serbian territory. It must also be said, however, that on the very important area of reforming the judicial system, nothing has happened apart from sacking a few judges. There is still no system in place for appointing good, well qualified judges and that is going to be a real problem and this could lead to real problems just through carelessness rather than malice which I think Croatia is actually quite a good example of that. I understand that there are a million court cases pending in Croatia at the moment for a country with a population of 4 million that is really pretty bad.

00:17:32
Cutaways
ICG office atmosphere, files on shelves, Nick Whyte walking around offices

Interview Nick Whyte

On organized crime

Organised crime is not something that is restricted to a particular country, it goes through existing trade routes, it flows from one place to another and it's quite clear that the headquarters for organised crime in the Balkans is Belgrade it is basically the centre of everything, geographically, politically, economically which therefore means that if the Serbian authorities do crack down on organised crime that it is going to make things much more difficult for the criminals in Bosnia and in Macedonia and that's a simple function of geography. It is of course important that the Bosnians and Macedonian authorities do their best to help out the Serbs and take action against their own people as well

00:19:04
On the political will to fight against organized crime

There is a bit of it in Bosnia, there is a bit I am not sure that it is vigorous enough; I mean we have seen moves from the Macedonian government certainly against the most notoriously corrupt officials from previous governments and in Bosnia of course we've seen very dramatic developments of the resignation of a member of the presidency and we 've seen the other moves against the hidden military formations which are also involved with organised crime themselves. However, you know, one would have to say that Serbs appear to be working harder on that.

00:19:41
Cutaways
ICG Office in Brussels
Nick Whyte in front of a map of BiH, shots of publications about the Balkans and BiH on a shel

00:20:07
Interview Nick Whyte

On Bosnia and Herzegovina

On the Bosnian judicial system, we have reported this over and over, there is still an awful lot more work that needs to be done on training the Bosnian judiciary and monitoring that it does its work properly. In most countries, of course, you take it as a given that judges are independently minded and adequately qualified, and in Bosnia this is not really the case and I would have said that it is too early to talk about the transfer of the cases that the Hague cannot manage to Bosnia. However, my impression is that this decision has already been taken; on Karadzic and Mladic; clearly they have protection from very senior political and military circles and there is no point in pretending otherwise. The international community has to keep up its pressure to get this one resolved. I do notice a change of tone coming from both Banja Luka and Belgrade on this one and I wouldn't be surprised if we see some developments on that in the next few months.

00:21:18
On the arrest of Naser Oric

Well, I think it is important to show that the Hague does not go just after Serbs, I think that's extremely important. Lots of, lots of horrible things were done by everybody in the Srebrenica area during the war, and everybody should be accountable for it.

00:21:38
On the ICG's views on eventual independence of Kosovo and Montenegro

On Montenegro we've taken a slightly different line than that which is that Montenegro should be allowed to make its own decision, without, without in the first place we were arguing against military pressure from Serbia and then we found ourselves actually arguing against political pressure from the EU to adopt decisions that would be a bad thing. I think it is interesting that since the Serbia- Montenegro agreement was signed a year ago, that we now have 60-70 % support for independence in Serbia never mind in Montenegro, it's actually higher, surprisingly. From Serbia's point of view it is important to have a single territory that is clearly under its control where there is a single point of contact for negotiations with the EU. I am skeptical about whether the Solana Agreement can provide that. I do think that the Montenegrins and Serbs both have an obligation to work at the Solana Agreement and to live up to the commitments they have made even if I don't think it is a particularly good agreement this is only three-year term and I think it is important for them to show the political maturity of honouring the bargain that they have made. In the case of Kosovo, I mean, we are not calling for independence tomorrow, what we do say is that we think the final status of Kosovo should be linked to the good behaviour of the Kosovo Albanians, which, on the whole, frankly has been lacking but that our prediction is that a stable future status of Kosovo is going to be independence or something that looks very much like independence and it's pointless to pretend otherwise.

There will have to be negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina and there will have to be an international input into those negotiations but the outcome should be supported by the international community and our prediction is that the most likely outcome is going to be independence.

00:23:36
Cutaways
ICG Office, map of Macedonia

00:24:23
Interview Nick Whyte

On Macedonia, and the recent declarations of ex-Prime Minister Georgievski on the eventual partition of Macedonia

I think it is very irresponsible of him to make these statements and I am quite happy to say that this is a man who as a prime minister of his country and the leader of his party signed up to the Ohrid agreement and I think it is very important that politicians anywhere honour the commitments they have made and live up to the agreement they have negotiated and I think it is irresponsible that he signed a piece of paper that he doesn't believe in anymore. There is no support in the international community for the partition of Macedonia, absolutely none, there is no support for a greater Albania in the international community or in Albania and I found it interesting that the most vigorous condemnation of Mister Georgievski's statement came from the Albanian foreign minister Ilir Meta, and I think that it raises questions which are simply distractions from the real business which is creating a stable state which is going to be able to integrate into Europe.

I think it tends to create instability where this need not have been done; the rest of the international community has firmly committed itself to the integrity of Macedonia, most Macedonian politicians have done so including the party of Ali Ahmeti which is the main ethnic Albanian political party in Macedonia so I think it is simply irresponsible.

00:25:44
On Albania

Like most of its neighbours, Albania is still a weak state, it still hasn't really dealt with problems of corruption and of organised crime which is still true for all the states in the region to a greater or lesser extent, and that is going to continue to be a problem, just in terms of Albania's general economic progress, let alone integration into the EU or into NATO. However, Albania has played a very positive role I think in peaceful coexistence, in respecting state borders where they are, and in not inflaming separatist sentiments anywhere in the neighborhood which is pretty impressive given the demographic structure of the Balkans.

On when the five (or seven?) Western Balkan countries will enter the EU

Of course, the question is wether there will be five countries or seven by the time we come to that, that's the first question you didn't ask but the second point is, I think, that the EU is serious about the Regatta principle and I think it is serious about not blocking people in a particular group because of their neighbours, so I would have thought it is quite lucky that Croatia will join the EU before Albania in terms of the countries in between on that queue, I don't think I could make any sensible prediction at this stage.

Cutaways exterior ICG building

END OF TRANSMISSION

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